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MEDICAID SPEND DOWN, ESTATE
RECOVERY AND DIVORCE:
DOCTRINE, PLANNING AND POLICY
John A. Miller
Medicaid is the need-based government program that pays for much of
the health care for the poor in the United States. Medicaid often ends up
paying the costs of nursing home care for middle-class seniors who have
descended into poverty as a result of the high costs of such care. For married
couples, Medicaid requires a “spend down” of both spouses’ assets before one
spouse can qualify for Medicaid support. This Article posits that, unless the
law is changed, divorce may well become standard Medicaid planning
practice in many circumstances. This will be especially true for middle and
upper-middle-class married couples because they have the most to gain from
divorce in this context. This Article argues that Medicaid’s approach toward
married couples is based on a narrow and outmoded image of marriage. It
assumes a marriage where the spouses have enjoyed a long life together, have
common intended beneficiaries, have no other person to whom they have an
equal or greater commitment, and it assumes a high level of commitment to
the institution of marriage itself. This view of marriage tends to not fit the
modern landscape where the marriage one inhabits in old age may be of newer
vintage and may not include children of the marriage. Added to this is the
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trend toward the “de-institutionalization” of marriage. The article contends
that as marriage becomes less sacred in our society, the utility of divorce as a
Medicaid planning strategy will outweigh its moral repugnance. This is
especially true because in this context, divorce does not require ending or
even substantially changing the day-to-day relationship of the parties. It
simply becomes a rational asset protection plan.
The alternative recommended to this developing trend is the
disaggregation of marital property for most Medicaid purposes. Thus,
instead of requiring the healthy spouse to spend down her or his assets before
the unhealthy spouse can qualify for Medicaid assistance as the present law
does, the Article recommends that only the assets properly allocable under
state law to the unhealthy spouse should be required to be spent down.
Similarly, estate recovery should only apply to the assets properly allocable to
the deceased person who received the Medicaid assistance during life. This
last point is particularly important in light of the apparent trend toward
more aggressive estate recovery in some states.

I.

Introduction

In the United States, much of the cost for longterm disability care is borne by the state and federal governments
1
through the Medicaid program. These costs are enormous because of
the millions of people who need such care and because of the high in2
dividual costs involved. In fiscal year 2012, Medicaid expenditures
3
for long-term care exceeded 120 billion dollars. For 2014, it was esti1. Medicaid paid for nearly half of all nursing home care in 2008. See RALPH
C. BRASHIER, MASTERING ELDER LAW 345 (Carolina Academic Press 2010). This is
because for most people, a period of extended disability leads to impoverishment.
A companion program, Medicare, provides nearly universal acute care health insurance for those sixty-five and older, but it does not cover custodial care such as
the care one might receive in a nursing home. For a useful summary of Medicare
and its limits see id. at Ch. 8. The costs of long-term health care represent one of
the biggest financial risks of old age. See John A. Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment
to Obtain Government Benefits, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 88 (2003). Longterm care insurance is available to those who are healthy and wealthy enough to
qualify and pay for it. However, its widespread use seems unlikely. Id. at 90 n.67.
2. In 2012, over eight million persons were receiving long-term care services
in the United States. About two million of those people were in nursing homes or
residential care communities. LAUREN HARRIS-KOJETIN, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013
OVERVIEW 38 (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nsltcp/long_
term_care_services_2013.pdf (estimating of the total annual costs of long-term care
in the United States to range from $200 to $300 billion).
3. Distribution of Medicaid Spending by Serving, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (2012), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/distribution-of-medicaid
-spending-by-service/.
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mated that the average annual base cost of a nursing home stay in a
semi-private room in the United States was about eighty thousand
4
dollars.
Medicaid is need-based and, thus, usually requires spend down
by the disabled person and his or her spouse before it can be ac5
cessed. In addition, though it exempts certain assets, most importantly the home, from being counted in determining need, federal law requires the states to recover Medicaid outlays from the “estate” of a
6
deceased Medicaid recipient under certain circumstances. Though
the primary asset to which this “estate recovery” typically applies is
7
the recipient’s home, estate recovery can range much more broadly.
In some states, estate recovery can even apply to the estate of the
8
Medicaid recipient’s spouse. In essence, Medicaid is designed to assure that it will bear the long-term care costs of a married person in a
manner that is thoroughly impoverishing to both spouses.
Planners have found many ways to ameliorate some of the harder edges of Medicaid. In an earlier article, two co-authors and I de9
scribed the Medicaid planning process in detail. Now, this Article
turns its attention to barriers to Medicaid planning presented by the
Medicaid spend down requirements and the estate recovery rules.
Most particularly, it illustrates the planning problems, opportunities,
strategies, and hazards associated with those rules in the context of
10
marriage. It is my thesis that the overall direction of the Medicaid
4. GENWORTH FINANCIAL, GENWORTH 2014 COST OF CARE SURVEY:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2014), available at https://www.genworth.com/dam/
Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer/corporate/131168-032514-Executive-Summarynonsecure.pdf.
5. Medicaid, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicarecosts/help-paying-costs/medicaid/medicaid.html (last visited March 10, 2015).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2012).
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. Sean R. Bleck et al., Preserving Wealth and Inheritance Through Medicaid
Planning for Long-term Care, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 153, 153–96 (2013) [hereinafter Bleck et al.]. One technique we did not address is what is known as “spousal
refusal”. For a useful treatment of this technique see Andrew W. Wone, Note,
Don’t Want to Pay for Your Institutionalized Spouse? The Role of Spousal Refusal and
Medicaid in funding Long-Term Care, 14 ELDER L.J. 485 (2006).
10. For an excellent broader treatment of disability planning see Ralph J.
Moore & Ron. M. Landsman, Planning for Disability, in TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS 816
(2d ed., 2000). Commerce Clearing House publishes a six-volume loose-leaf service called the MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE. See MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
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system is toward encouraging divorce where one spouse needs MediMedicaid assistance and the other does not.
Elder law attorneys have understood for some time that divorce
11
12
can be an effective Medicaid planning tool. But, in the past, married
couples have been reluctant to take that path and other strategies were
available. As a new generation, the baby boomers, enters old age and
as states become more aggressive in their approaches to estate
recovery, I think this will change. Divorce will be an especially
important Medicaid and estate recovery planning technique in those
states that employ estate recovery against the estate of the
independent spouse to pay for costs incurred on behalf of the
13
Medicaid recipient spouse.
This Article posits that, unless the law is changed, divorce may
well become standard Medicaid planning practice in many
circumstances. This will be especially true for middle-and uppermiddle class married couples because they have the most to gain from
divorce in this context. Part of the reason for this is that Medicaid’s
approach toward married couples is based on a narrow and
14
outmoded image of marriage.
It assumes a marriage where the
GUIDE (Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1969-1972). Other valuable loose leaf resources are JOHN J. REGAN, ET AL., TAX, ESTATE & FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE
ELDERLY (Matthew Bender 2014) (there is an accompanying forms book); THOMAS
D. BEGLEY, JR. & JO-ANNE HERINA JEFFREYS, REPRESENTING THE ELDERLY CLIENT:
LAW AND PRACTICE (Wolters Kluwer 2015); A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON ET AL.,
ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT (West 2010); ROBERT B. FLEMING & LISA
NACHMIAS, ELDER LAW ANSWER BOOK (Wolters Kluwer 2014); JERRY A. HYMAN,
ELDER LAW AND FINANCIAL STRATEGIES: PLANNING FOR LATER LIFE (Law Journal
Press 2015). In this article I rely heavily on BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra, to address
matters that are typically established by state law. Medicaid is a remarkable mosaic of state and federal law, and that makes writing about it from a national perspective especially challenging.
11. See, e.g., Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Love May Be Less Wonderful The Second Time
Around (Medicaid Considerations When Well-to-do, Healthy Clients Remarry and their
Late-in-Life Companions are less Well-to-Do), 13 NAELA Q. 11 (2000); Michael Wytychak III, Payment of Nursing Home Bills Through the Medicaid Program, 36 IDAHO L
REV. 243 (2000); Michael Farley, Note, When “I Do” Becomes “I Don’t”: Eliminating
the Divorce Loophole to Medicaid Eligibility, 9 ELDER L.J. 27 (2001).
12. Greta Weber, Till Debt Do Us Part, MILWAUKEE MAG. (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.milwaukeemag.com/2014/08/26/tilldebtdouspart/.
13. Id.; Craig Reaves, Paying for the ‘Institutionalized Spouse, N.Y. TIMES (June
4, 2010), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/047/paying-for-theinstitiutionalized-spouse/.
14. See Farley, supra note 11.
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spouses have enjoyed a long life together, have common intended
beneficiaries, have no other person to whom they have an equal or
greater commitment, and it assumes a high level of commitment to
15
the institution of marriage itself. This view of marriage tends to not
fit the modern landscape where the marriage one inhabits in old age
may be of newer vintage and may not include children of the
marriage. Added to this is the trend toward “de-institutionalization”
of marriage described in some detail by Professor Anne Alstott in a
16
recent article in The Tax Law Review. In her view, “[m]ore than ever
before, Americans see marriage as one of many options for personal
growth and fulfillment, and they form and exit marriages along with
17
other relationships as a normal part of the life course.” I suggest that
as marriage becomes less sacred in our society, the utility of divorce as
a Medicaid planning strategy will outweigh its moral repugnance.
This is especially true because in this context divorce does not require
ending or even substantially changing the day-to-day relationship of
the parties. It simply becomes a rational asset protection plan. The
great irony of this state of affairs is that the persons who could derive
the most financial benefit from divorce, the upper-middle class, are
among the class of persons who heretofore have been the most likely
18
to marry and stay married. In a sense, Medicaid has laid siege to the
last bastion of marriage as a life-long institution.
The alternative I recommend to this developing trend is the
disaggregation of marital property for most Medicaid purposes.
Thus, instead of requiring the healthy spouse to spend down his or
her assets before the unhealthy spouse can qualify for Medicaid
assistance as present law requires, I recommend that only the assets
properly allocable under state law to the unhealthy spouse should be
required to be spent down. Similarly, estate recovery should only
apply to the property interests allocable to the deceased person who
received the Medicaid assistance during life. This last point is
particularly important in light of the apparent trend toward more
19
aggressive estate recovery in some states.
15. Id.
16. Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and
Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 697 (2013).
17. Id. at 697.
18. Id. at 699.
19. Medicaid Estate Recovery, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2005),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/estaterec.htm.
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In what follows, this Article begins by explaining the present
structure of Medicaid law and especially develops the rules
concerning spend down and estate recovery. Then, it describes the
various planning strategies that have emerged in response to those
rules. It concludes that part by illustrating the ways in which divorce
may effectively avoid both spend down and estate recovery. In the
final sections, it briefly describes the policy concerns raised by the
estate recovery activities of the states and makes the case for
disaggregation of marital property for most purposes.
Most of what is found in this Article has application throughout
the United States. Even so, it is important for the reader to keep in
mind that every state Medicaid program has its unique features and
rules. Some of the more prominent differences between states are
addressed here, especially the differences that arise between
community property and common law states.

II. An Overview of Medicaid and Its Eligibility Rules
Medicaid is a state and federally funded medical assistance
program for certain people, including the elderly and disabled, who
20
have income and assets below specified standards.
It provides
comprehensive medical coverage for persons in the federal welfare
categories (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and
Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled) and
for various additional classes of persons including those requiring
21
long-term care. As noted above, Medicaid is a significant cost to
federal and state governments alike, and they restrict access to its
22
support.
Medicaid planning, consequently, often requires the
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012). As discussed in the text, Medicaid is structured to be implemented on a state-by-state basis. In Washington, for example,
Medicaid is administered by the Health and Recovery Services Administration
(“HRSA”) of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
(“DSHS”). Washington Apple Health (Medicaid), WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH.,
http://hrsa.dshs.wa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (outlining updated information related to eligibility standards).
21. Medical Programs, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS. http://
www.dshs.wa.gov/esa/community-services-offices/medical-programs (last visited March 18, 2015).
22. See BRASHIER, supra note 1; Congressional policy is to resist Medicaid
planning and to make concerted efforts to restrict access to Medicaid. This policy
was expressed most recently by the Deficit Reduction Act of 200522 (often referred
to as the “DRA”). The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171, 120 Stat.
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assistance of attorneys and others with special expertise in the gov23
government benefits field.
As Bleck, Isenhour, & Miller state, “Medicaid planning may be
defined as the process of effectively accessing government resources
to pay for long-term health care of a disabled person in the manner
that is least financially disruptive to the wellbeing of the person’s
24
spouse and family.” As already noted, the government resources
25
come from Medicaid. Estate recovery planning may be described as
the end game of Medicaid planning.
At the federal level, Medicaid is administered by the Center for
Medicaid and Medicare Services (“CMS”) which is part of the
26
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). In each state,
Medicaid is administered by the cabinet-level agency charged with
27
oversight of public health. Each of those agencies promulgates rules
28
and regulations to implement Medicaid within its state’s borders.
A.

The Basics: Eligibility and Benefits
29

The state Medicaid agency makes two determinations. First,
whether the applicant needs long-term care and, second, whether the
30
applicant meets the financial eligibility criteria. The determination
for long-term care requires one to need substantial assistance with two
or more of the following activities of daily living (ADLs): eating,
bathing, toileting, ambulation, transfer, positioning, and medication
31
management.
4 was signed into law on February 8, 2006. This legislation made major changes in
the rules governing eligibility for Medicaid long-term care coverage that tightened
up what is known as the “spend down” process. Id.
23. Typically one seeking assistance in this area might look to Legal Aid Attorneys and/or attorneys who are designated Certified Elder Law Attorneys
(CELAs) by the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA).
24. Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 155. See also Miller, supra note 1, at 91–92.
25. Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 158.
26. 42 C.F.R. § 430 (2015).
27. See State Medicaid & CHIP Profiles, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.
gov/medicaid-Chip-Program-Information/By-State/By-State.html.
28. Id.
29. See MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, WASH. ST.
DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS. 1, 5 (2012), available at http://www.dshs.wa.
gov/sites/default/files/ALTSA/hcs/documents/22-619.pdf.
30. Id.
31. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-335-015 (44)(e) (2012).
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As discussed in more detail below, financial eligibility involves
32
meeting both asset and income tests. There are special rules for
33
married couples for each of these tests.
For persons eligible for
nursing home coverage, Medicaid requires that all income, after the
34
special allocations described below, be paid to the nursing home.
The amount that the Medicaid recipient pays to the nursing home
35
each month is called “participation.” Medicaid will then pay the
nursing home the difference between the recipient’s participation and
36
the Medicaid reimbursement rate for the facility. A typical Medicaid
37
reimbursement rate is $1,080 per month. When a person qualifies for
nursing home coverage, Medicaid also provides coverage for most
38
medical expenses, such as prescriptions and physician bills.
Some states have Medicaid programs that are designed to help
39
persons avoid institutionalization. These will cover long-term care
delivered at home, in adult family homes, and in assisted-living
40
facilities. States are required to cover benefits for some assistedliving facilities, but coverage of most home and community-based
41
long-term care services is optional.
The result is a “historical
42
structural bias toward institutional care.”

32. See infra Part II.A. 1 & 2.
33. See infra Part II.A. 4.
34. Pub. 17, Transmittal No. 97–2, Dec. 10, 1997.
35. See also MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, supra
note 29, at 9.
36. The Medicaid reimbursement rate is based on the facility’s costs to provide care and the level of need of the residents and varies with each facility, but is
always less than the private pay rate. 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(b)(1)(iii) (2012); see also
MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, supra note 29 at 6.
37. Medicaid Payments per Enrollee, FY2010, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (2010), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-payments-perenrollee/.
38. FERD MITCHELL & CHERYL MITCHELL, LEGAL PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS OF
U.S. NATIONAL HEALTH CARE PLAN § 3:12 (2014).
39. Erica Reaves & MaryBeth Musumeci, Medicaid and Long-Term Services and
Supports: A Primer, Medicaid Long-Term Services and Supports, THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (July 30, 2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/report/medicaid-andlong-term-services-and-supports-a-primer/.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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INCOME

The federal government has established statutory income
44
requirements for an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid. In thirtynine states, eligibility for Medicaid is automatic when an individual
45
qualifies for Social Security disability benefits. The remaining states
use more restrictive requirements than Social Security disability to
46
determine Medicaid eligibility.
For individuals applying for an
47
institutional level of care, some states have an income cap. In other
states, if an applicant’s income is above the Medicaid rate and below
the private pay rate, the applicant will be certified as eligible for
Medicaid and will only have to pay the Medicaid rate; in that case,
however, the applicant must spend down the excess income over the
Medicaid rate on medical costs before he or she will be eligible for
48
Medicaid coverage for other medical expenses.
2.

49

RESOURCES

An unmarried recipient of Medicaid cannot have more than
50
$2,000 in non-exempt resources. Resources are valued according to
the fair market value of the applicant’s equity interest in the
51
resource. Joint bank accounts are presumed to be owned entirely by
the applicant unless the applicant establishes a different ownership
52
distribution. Assets owned jointly by spouses are presumed to be
owned proportionately, unless a different ownership allocation can be
43. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10; see Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, http://
www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Eligibility/Eligibility.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
44. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.120, 435.121 (2014); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at
§ 7.03.
45. 42 C.F.R. § 435.120; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.03[A].
46. 42 C.F.R. § 435.121; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.03[B].
47. The cap in 2014 is 300% of the Federal SSI benefit rate, $2,163 per month.
Eligibility, supra note 43; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §7.04[A]; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(cc)(1)(C)(ii)(I) (2012).
48. 42 C.F.R. § 435.4; see BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.04[B].
49. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a) (2014); see also BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10,
at § 7.05[F][1].
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B) (2013); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205; see BEGLEY &
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][1][a].
51. 20 C.F.R. 416.1201(b)–(c); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at
§ 7.05[F][1][a].
52. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1208(c); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at
§ 7.05[F][1][a][i].
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established. However, title has little significance in the marital concontext since, with certain exceptions described below, all assets of the
couple are required to be spent down in order to obtain eligibility for
54
either spouse. This can be a vital disadvantage to marriage.
3.

55

EXEMPT RESOURCES

Some resources are deemed “exempt” resources when
determining whether a Medicaid applicant meets resource ceiling of
56
The applicant’s home (including a mobile home or a
$2,000.
condominium) is exempt if the applicant or the applicant’s spouse is
residing in the home or the applicant (or his or her representative)
57
states that he or she intends to return home. Under
the
Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, states must impose a limit on exempt home
58
equity ranging from $500,000 to $750,000. The home equity limit
does not apply if the home is occupied by a spouse or by a disabled
59
child, blind child, or child under twenty-one. This limit also does not
apply to the value of home equity owned by the spouse of an
60
applicant. A home includes all contiguous property, even if this
includes several lots, legal descriptions or tax parcels, and includes
61
related “out-buildings” on the property. Proceeds from the sale of a
home are exempt if used within three months of receipt of the
62
proceeds to purchase another home.
Rent from the home is income to the recipient, which generally
53. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1208(c).
54. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][1][a].
55. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210; see also BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at
§ 7.05[F][1][b].
56. Financial Requirements–Assets, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
(2015), http://longtermcare.gov/medicare-medicaid-more/medicaid/medicaideligibility/financial-requirements-assets/.
57. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1210, 416.1216.
58. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–171, Title VI, Chap. 2, Subchap.
A, § 6014, 120 Stat. 65 (enacted Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ171/pdf/PLAW-109publ171.pdf [hereinafter DRA
2005]; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(1) (2012). There was no value limit on the home for applications prior to this date. Federal law now allows the states to exclude no less
than $500,000 and no more than $750,000 of equity. Id. See Michael Gilfix, Planning for the Home Under Tougher Medicaid Rules, 35 Est. Plan. 27, 29 (2008).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(2).
60. Id.
61. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212(a) (2014).
62. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212(e)–(f).

MILLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

NUMBER 1

6/16/2015 2:51 PM

MEDICAID, ESTATE RECOVERY, AND DIVORCE

51

63

must be paid toward the cost of care. However, certain expenses
such as interest (but not principal) on home mortgage debt, taxes,
insurance, and maintenance expenses for the home can be offset in
64
calculating countable income from rent. It is not uncommon for
family members of a Medicaid recipient to reside in the home rent65
free, and this use is generally ignored by state Medicaid authorities.
As explained in the discussion of Medicaid estate recovery
below, Medicaid will usually have a claim against the Medicaid
recipient’s interest in an exempt home at the time of death of the
Medicaid recipient for most costs paid by Medicaid after the recipient
66
turned fifty-five. Exempt items other than the home may include a
vehicle, household furnishings, personal effects, burial plots, certain
67
burial funds, small life insurance policies, and certain annuities.
With respect to annuities, however, the payments are counted as
68
income for Medicaid participation purposes.
4.

ADDITIONAL RULES FOR MARRIED COUPLES

Medicaid has a number of rules that in theory are designed to
protect the income and assets of one spouse, often called the
69
“community spouse,” when the other spouse qualifies for Medicaid.
Nominally speaking, these rules are designed to avoid the
“impoverishment” of the community spouse. The income rules are
70
reasonably generous, but the resource rules are not.
The federal Medicaid statute expressly preempts state
community property law for purposes of determining the ownership
71
of income and assets. Medicaid determines ownership according to
63.
64.
65.

See generally 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212.
Id.
See Buying a House for a Special Needs Beneficiary: Proceed with Care!,
SPECIAL NEEDS ALLIANCE (May 2011), http://www.specialneedsalliance.org/thevoice/buying-a-house-for-a-special-needs-beneficiary-proceed-with-care-2/.
66. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.02[C], 9.04.
67. Michael Wytychack III, Payment of Nursing Home Bills Through the Medicaid
Program, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 243, 249 (2000).
68. Id.
69. HFCA Transmittal 64 § 3528.11.
70. These Medicaid eligibility rules for a married couple apply only when one
spouse is in the nursing home. If both spouses are in a nursing home, they will be
treated as though they were single and the Medicaid income and resource rules
for single persons, discussed above, will apply for each.
71. 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(b)(2) (2012).
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the name in which income is received. This is sometimes called the
73
“name on the check” rule.
With respect to resources, Medicaid
74
nominally accords importance to the titling of an asset. However,
the asset spend down rules apply without regard to title in most
75
instances.
76

a. Income Eligibility
For one spouse of a married couple to receive Medicaid coverage
for nursing home care, some states require that the income of that
spouse must be less than the facility’s private pay rate plus his or her
77
regularly recurring monthly medical expenses. Other states have an
78
income cap for the Medicaid applicant of 300% of the federal SSI rate.
The income of the nursing home spouse (called the “institutional”
spouse) is determined by first seeing what income comes in the name
79
of that spouse. If this amount exceeds the eligibility standard, the
person, under certain circumstances, may still be eligible if one-half of
80
the income of both spouses is less than the eligibility standard.
b. Resource Eligibility
All resources of both spouses are considered in determining elieligibility, regardless of which spouse owns what resource or whether
81
the property is considered to be separate or community property.
82
Prenuptial and Separate Property Agreements are disregarded.
Transfers between spouses before application have no effect on this
72. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SPOUSES OF MEDICAID LONG-TERM
CARE RECIPIENTS 5 (2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/
spouses.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(b), (d), §182-513-1395 (2012); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100
(2014).
77. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][2][a].
78. Id.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(2); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at
§ 7.05[F][4][a]. This is aptly called the “Name on the Check” rule.
80. Id.
81. See 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(c)(2), (f).
82. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 9(b) (2012); The Elder Law Approach
to Estate Planning, SH059 ALI-ABA 375, 388 (2003); See Elder Law and Estate Planning, SH092 ALI-ABA 509, 530 (2003).
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83

initial eligibility determination.
Because the resources test for Medicaid eligibility lumps all of
the assets of a married couple together, assets owned solely by the
community spouse may have to be spent down in order for the insti84
institutional spouse to qualify. In order for the institutional spouse
entering a nursing home to qualify for Medicaid nursing home
coverage, the married couple’s combined non-exempt resources must
85
be less than an inflation-adjusted specified amount. This inflationadjusted specified amount is called the Community Spouse Resource
86
87
Allowance (CSRA). In 2015, the maximum CSRA is $119,220.
Any
of the couple’s combined non-exempt assets in excess of the maximum
CSRA plus $2,000 must be spent down before Medicaid eligibility is
88
obtained for the institutional spouse.
5.

TRANSFER OF ASSETS RULES

Medicaid’s transfer of asset rules delay eligibility for nursing
89
home coverage for a period of time. This is called the transfer penal90
penalty. The purpose of the penalty is to deter transferors from
voluntarily impoverishing themselves in order to qualify for Medicaid
91
coverage for their long-term care costs. The typical example of such
92
a transfer is a large gift of cash or property to the transferor’s child.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(1).
84. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-5(f), (c); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at
§ 7.05[F][4][d].
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f). The 2015 minimum spousal resource allowance is
$23,844. See 2015 SSI and Spousal Impoverishment Standards, MEDICAID.GOV (Jan. 1,
2015),
http://medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/by-topics/
eligibility/downloads/2015-ssi-and-spousal-impoverishment-standards.pdf
[hereinafter Spousal Impoverishment Standards]86. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(2).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(2); see Spousal Impoverishment Standards, supra note
85.
88. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-5(c), (f); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10 at
§ 7.05[F][4][d].
89. See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 132 (West Academic Publishing, 6th ed. 2014).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A).
91. Gratuitous transfers are the primary target of these rules but some transfers for value are also subject to them. See Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 174.
92. See Bernard A. Krooks, How Gifts Can Affect Medicaid Eligibility, FORBES
(Dec. 17, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardkrooks/2012/
12/17/how-gifts-can-affect-medicaid-eligibility/ (discussing Medicaid’s “look
back” and “transfer penalty” rules).

MILLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

54

The Elder Law Journal

6/16/2015 2:51 PM

VOLUME 23

There is no transfer penalty for transfers to a spouse because such
93
transfers generally do not avoid spend down.
Only transfers within a certain period of time before application
is made, called the “look-back period,” are subject to the transfer
94
penalty. The look-back period is sixty months for all transfers made
95
on or after February 8, 2006. Transfers not within the look-back
96
period have no effect on Medicaid eligibility. Thus, for example, if a
person gives away one million dollars six years before applying for
Medicaid, that gift will not be considered in determining eligibility. A
typical way to calculate the transfer penalty is to “divid[e] the fair
market value of the transferred asset by the statewide monthly
average lowest semiprivate room rate for Medicaid certified nursing
97
facilities calculated annually.” The result of this division, rounded
down to the next whole number, will result in the number of days of
98
ineligibility caused by the gifts given in that month. The penalty is
imposed on the day of the transfer or the month following the day of
99
transfer.
There are a number of transfers that are exceptions to the
Medicaid asset transfer rules and do not cause the imposition of a
period of ineligibility. These include gifts not within the sixty month
“look-back period,” transfer of the home to a child of the applicant
who has lived in the home, and provided care to the applicant (which
was necessary for the applicant to remain independent) for the two
100
year period immediately prior to institutionalization. Transfer of the
home to a sibling of the applicant who has an equity interest in the
home and who has lived in the home for the one-year period immediately prior to institutionalization and a transfer of the home to a child
93. See id.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2012).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. This is the number for applications submitted on or after October 1, 2010,
and it will be adjusted each October. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at
§ 7.06[G][1].
98. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN. TRANSMITTAL 64 § 3258.4E; BEGLEY &
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.06[G][1].
99. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN. Transmittal 64 § 3258.5A; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS,
supra note 10, at § 7.06[G][1].
100. See Medicaid Treatment of the Home: Determining Eligibility and Repayment
for Long-Term Care, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES (Apr. 2005),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/hometreat.htm.

MILLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

NUMBER 1

6/16/2015 2:51 PM

MEDICAID, ESTATE RECOVERY, AND DIVORCE

55

101

under age twenty-one.
6.

POST-ELIGIBILITY RULES

Generally, a person in a nursing facility who has been determined eligible for Medicaid must pay virtually all of his or her income
102
to the facility for the cost of his or her care. The community spouse
can keep all checks paid in his or her name, regardless of amount and
regardless of whether the income may be characterized as community
103
income.
Income includes wages, pensions, social security, VA or
104
military payments, interest or dividends, and annuities.
If the income in the name of the community spouse is less than
an inflation adjusted amount ($1,938.75 in 2014) the community
spouse can keep enough of the nursing home spouse’s income to
105
bring the community spouse’s income up to that amount. This is referred to as the spousal Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Al106
lowance (MMMNA).
Generally, money or property received by a Medicaid nursing
107
home resident, will be deemed income in the month received. States
take different approaches to setting income caps on Medicaid eligibility. But if a Medicaid recipient’s income exceeds the state-determined
108
cap then the income will cause ineligibility. To the extent the income is not spent and causes the resident’s non-exempt resources to
exceed $2,000 as of the first moment of the next month, the excess re109
sources may cause ineligibility (or require a resource spend-down).

101.
102.
103.

See id.
See 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(d) (2012).
See 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(d). See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN RESOURCES, SPOUSES OF MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE RECIPIENTS (2005),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/spouses.htm.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a (2010); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at
§ 7.05[F][2][b].
105. See MEDICAID, SSI AND SPOUSAL IMPOVERISHMENT STANDARDS,
MEDICAID.GOV (2014), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Eligibility/Downloads/Spousal-Impoverish
ment-2014.pdf.
106. See Tools & Calculators, ELDER LAW ANSWERS, http://www.elderlaw
answers.com/tool-andcalculators (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c) (2014); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201, 416.1207 (2014); BEGLEY &
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][1][c].
108. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[2][a].
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205.

MILLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

56

6/16/2015 2:51 PM

VOLUME 23

The Elder Law Journal
110

Disclaimer cannot avoid this outcome.
In most states, cash received from the sale of an exempt or nonexempt resource other than the home is not income in the month received, but is a countable resource if it is held as of the first of the next
111
month. The proceeds from the sale of a home remain exempt provided they are reinvested in another home “within three months of
112
receipt.” The proceeds from the sale of other exempt resources are
counted as available resources unless reinvested in another exempt
113
resource. While not required, transferring title of exempt resources
solely into the name of the community spouse can avoid ineligibility
in some states for the nursing home spouse in the event the resources
114
are sold, as well as protect the assets from Medicaid estate recovery.
While this result is sensible, it is not required of the states. It may be
that, in time, more and more states will act to close this planning opportunity.
With respect to the community spouse, there is a one-time only
115
“snapshot” of community resources: at the time of initial eligibility.
Unless the nursing home spouse is deinstitutionalized, or becomes ineligible for Medicaid, increases or changes of the form of wealth of the
community spouse—and, in many states, even uncompensated trans116
fers by the community spouse—are disregarded.

III. Medicaid Estate Recovery
Since 1993, Federal law has required that the states seek to recover Medicaid outlays from the “estate” of the recipient under certain
117
circumstances. The primary asset to which this estate recovery rule

110. See generally, Cynthia L. Barrett, Disclaimer and Elective Share in the Medicaid Context, 1 MARQUETTE’S ELDER ADVISOR 40 (2000); See also LAWRENCE A.
FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 263,
317–21 (4th Ed. 2007).
111. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][6].
112. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212.
113. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., FAMILIES FIRST ONLINE POLICY MANUAL § 17.2,
available
at
http://www.tennessee.gov/humanserv/adfam/ff_olm/17.2%20
Resources-Countable-NonCountable%20Resources.htm.
114. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1242; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A) (2014); see BEGLEY &
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 8.05[B][1][a] note 52, 8.05[B][2].
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b).
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118

applies is the home, but as discussed below, its application can
range much more broadly. Also, as discussed below, there are strategies for avoiding estate recovery. It is in states that are most aggressive in pursuing estate recovery that divorce may become the paramount strategy. Before delving into this area, it is necessary to
appreciate the basic rules.
A.

The General Rule

The State has a right to recover from the “estate” of a Medicaid
recipient when Medicaid benefits were paid on behalf of the decedent
119
after he or she turned fifty-five.
This right of recovery normally
arises at death against any property in which the Medicaid recipient
120
had an interest at the moment of death. However, as I will describe,
some states have broadened the estate recovery rule to include prop121
erty transferred away prior to death.
B.

The Recipient’s “Estate”

Medicaid estate recovery only applies to the “estate” of the Med122
icaid recipient. However, the definition of “estate” employed in
123
some states is much broader than the typical use of the term. Normally, the term “estate” might be thought to include only property
owned at death—that is, the probate estate. However, a federal statute gives states the latitude to broaden the definition to include non124
probate assets which pass at death.
That statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(b)(4), provides in pertinent part:
[T]he term “estate”, with respect to a deceased individual—
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets
included within the individual’s estate, as defined for purposes of
State probate law; and (B) may include, at the option of the
118. See FLEMING & NACHMIAS, supra note 10, at Q 17:92. The states are required to attempt recovery against the home. West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d, 281, 297 (4th Cir. 2002).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4).
121. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785
(Idaho 2012) (discussed infra).
122. 20 C.F.R. § 416.570 (2014); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.07[F][5].
123. Medicaid Estate Recovery, supra note 19.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
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State . . . any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life es125
tate, living trust, or other arrangement.

A reasonable reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) is that the state
can make recovery against assets in which the recipient had an interest during life to the extent of the interest that passed from the recipient at death to some other person by means of a will, trust, contract,
126
intestacy, or by operation of law.
However, at least one court has
interpreted “estate” to include even assets in which the Medicaid recipient had no property interest at death if the recipient had an interest in the asset at some earlier point and transferred it away gratui127
128
tously.
That case, Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare v. McCormick,
arose from bad, yet not unusual, facts and, as will be discussed, creates particular pressure for the use of divorce as a mechanism for
avoiding estate recovery. But, before discussing McCormick, it will be
useful to consider how the estate of the recipient’s spouse may also be
subject to estate recovery.
C.

The Estate of the Recipient’s Spouse

The application of estate recovery against the estate of the Medicaid recipient’s spouse can arise by two distinct paths depending on
whether the state involved is a common law or a community property
129
state.
125. Id.
126. This reading of the statute was embraced by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. See In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008).
127. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 790–91
(Idaho 2012) (“However, the federal statute also expressly allows states to expand
the definition of ‘estate’ beyond the ‘real and personal property and other assets’
in the individual’s own estate to also include ‘any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the
time of death.’”).
128. McCormick has been followed in Idaho by another decision that again
upheld estate recovery against the estate of the community spouse. See Idaho v.
Wiggins, 306 P.3d 201 (Idaho 2013).
129. Begley & Jeffreys argue that estate recovery against the estates of community spouses was never intended under federal law but accept that it is occurring. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 9.08[A].
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In common law states, the surviving spouse has the right to elect
130
against the will of the decedent spouse. If the decedent spouse dies
131
intestate, the surviving spouse is also entitled to a share.
Thus, in
common law states, the surviving spouse nearly always has some
132
claim against the estate of the predeceasing spouse. If the surviving
spouse is a Medicaid recipient, some states apply estate recovery to
133
the survivor’s claim against the decedent spouse’s estate.
In these
states, the state Medicaid agency may force the election by the surviving spouse.
In community property states, each spouse is deemed to own one
half of the community property, and, with limited exceptions, there is
134
no right to elect against the will.
However, the first spouse to die
has no right to deprive the surviving spouse of his or her share of the
community property. In other words, the decedent’s will cannot dispose of the surviving spouse’s share of the community property without his or her consent. Moreover, in a community property state if a
spouse dies intestate, the decedent’s half of the community property
135
usually passes to the surviving spouse. In that case, creditors of the
survivor can pursue the survivor’s interest acquired by intestate suc136
cession. Even if the decedent spouse dies with a will, the creditors
130. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-202(a) (2013). (“The surviving spouse of a decedent
who dies domiciled in this state has a right of election . . . to take an elective-share
amount equal to 50 percent of the value of the marital property portion of the
augmented estate.”)
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., id.; In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. 2008).
133. Cynthia L. Barrett, Disclaimer and Elective Share in the Medicaid Context, 1
MARQ. ELDER ADVISOR 40, 43–45 (2000). See, e.g., In re Estate of Shipman, 832
N.W.2d 335 (S.D. 2013); See Tannler v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs.,
564 N.W.2d 735 (Wis. 1997). For an interesting variation on this theme see Estate
of Demartino v. Div. Med. Assistance Health Serv., 861 A.2d 138 (N.J. 2011). For
more discussion see also Julia Belian, Medicaid, Elective Shares, and the Ghosts of Tenures Past, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1111, 1133 (2005).
134. What constitutes community property may vary somewhat from state to
state. But, in general, it is the earned income of a married couple and the property
acquired with that income while domiciled in a community property state. See,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (2015). In some community property states, income
from separate property is community property. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32–906
(2015). See, e.g., I.G. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 900 A.2d 840 (2006); Miller v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 275 Kans. 349 (2003); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra
note 10, at § 7.06[E][3].
135. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2–102A(b) (2013).
136. Id.
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of the surviving spouse have a claim against all of the community
137
property of the two spouses. Under this logic, estate recovery may
be had against the estate of the community spouse for Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of the institutional spouse. An important difference to note between common law states and community property
states is that, normally, in a community property state, one would not
expect estate recovery to apply to the community spouse’s estate
where there is no community property and no bequest to or inher138
itance by the institutional spouse.
This brings us back to McCormick which involved the estate of
139
George Perry. Mr. Perry and his wife, Martha Perry, resided in Ida140
ho, a community property state. Their home originally was Martha’s
separate property, which she subsequently converted to community
141
property. A few years later, she executed a durable power of attor142
ney appointing George as her agent.
A few months later, George
used the durable power to quit claim Martha’s interest in the home to
143
himself. About that same time, Martha qualified for Medicaid assis144
145
tance.
Less than three years later, George predeceased Martha.
146
She then died a little more than a year after George’s passing. The
only significant asset in George’s estate was the home, which was
147
formerly owned by Martha, and now worth about $80,000. Idaho’s
Medicaid agency filed a claim against his estate for the more than
148
$100,000 in Medicaid benefits it had bestowed upon Martha.
One can readily see the equity in the state’s claim. The only major asset in George’s estate was the home that originally belonged to
137. For a discussion of this principle as applied in California see CHARLOTTE
K. GOLDBERG, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS
225–26 (Wolters Kluwer, 3d ed. 2010).
138. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transistion, 59 MO. L.
REV. 21, 27 (1994) (discussing the default rules followed when allocating property
in community property and separate property states).
139. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 791 (Idaho
2012).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 786.
148. Id. at 786–87.
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149

Martha. Upon George’s death, one could argue that it represented
good policy to have the home used to help pay for Martha’s medical
150
151
bills.
But, George’s estate consisted of no community property.
Thus, under general principles of Idaho law, Martha’s creditor, the
Idaho Medicaid agency, should have had no allowable claim against
the home. Nonetheless, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the agency’s
152
claim. It did so relying on a complex web of federal and state Medicaid statutes and regulations that we will not seek to fully recapitulate
153
here. However, the portion of the court’s analysis of the applicable
federal statutes is worth reviewing since it represents a major depar154
ture from most prior interpretations by other state courts.
It may
represent the direction that estate recovery will take in the future if, as
it seems likely, pressure grows for more draconian treatment of Medi155
caid recipients and their families.
In McCormick, the Idaho Supreme Court focused on two of the
156
federal statutes. The first statute defines the scope of estate recovery
and the second defines the word “assets” as it is used in Medicaid
157
law. Let us take them one at a time.
Recall that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p allows estate recovery against the
“estate” of the Medicaid recipient and also against:
“. . . any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual

149. Id.
150. Medicaid does not seek to levy against the home while the community
spouse is living in it, even when the home is owned solely by the institutional
spouse. See infra Part II.A.3.
151. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 795.
152. Id. at 785–86.
153. The end of the Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis was to uphold a state regulation that authorized estate recovery against any asset that had ever been community property, even where the institutional spouse had no present interest in
the property at the time of her death.
154. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 792.
155. This assumes no interference at the federal level. This appears to be a safe
assumption since the federal government already seems to be turning a blind eye
to state actions that arguably contravene federal policy. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS,
supra note 10 at § 9.04[B][5].
156. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 790.
157. Id. at 791.
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through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life es158
tate, living trust, or other arrangement.”

The Idaho Supreme Court concluded from this language that the
state Medicaid agency could lay claim to assets in which the deceased
159
Medicaid recipient had no interest at death. It arrived at this conclusion by assuming that the language “life estate or living trust” could
refer to circumstances in which the decedent had conveyed away all
160
interest in the asset prior to death.
This analysis fails to appreciate how life estates and living trusts
are normally used in the estate planning environment. Transfer of a
remainder while retaining a life estate is a common device in estate
161
planning. The range of tools to accomplish this is large and can extend from outright transfer of the remainder in fee to the use of various trusts, including living trusts. A typical living trust is a will substitute involving transfer of assets to an inter vivos revocable trust for
162
the benefit of the grantor. These are widely used for disability plan163
ning and for probate avoidance. Only at the grantor’s death do such
164
trusts benefit third parties. If the grantors are a married couple, the
trust typically continues until the death of both grantors, upon which
165
the trust is then distributed to the children or other beneficiaries. In
such circumstances, the transfer of beneficial ownership occurs at the
death of the grantor just like the other arrangements referred to in the
166
statute.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2012).
159. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 793.
160. Id. at 792. The Court declined to follow the reasoning of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in In Re Estate of Barg where the court applied the doctrine of
ejusdum generis to find that the phrase must refer to conveyances of interests that
occur at death. See In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 70 (Minn. 2008).
161. See, e.g., RAY D. MADOFF ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING
§§ 4.05, 8.07 (Wolters Kluwer 2014). Many of these tools have a significant estate
tax planning purpose that is not relevant in the Medicaid context. See John A. Miller & Jeffrey A Maine, Wealth Transfer Tax Planning for 2013 and Beyond, 2013 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 879, 880 (2013).
162. See, e.g., WAYNE M. GAZUR & ROBERT M. PHILLIPS, ESTATE PLANNING:
PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS, 398–99 (3d ed. 2012); RAY D. MADOFF ET AL., supra note
161.
163. Do I Need a Living Trust?, THE STATE BAR OF CA. (2011), http://
www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7xX4AesY230%3d&tabid=1341.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Certainly the phrase “life estate or living trust” can describe
many other arrangements concluded during life. However, a sensible
167
application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis leads to an understanding that the “life estates, living trusts and other arrangements” referred to are ones where beneficial enjoyment passes to another upon
168
the death of the original owner. In short, contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, fairly interpreted, does not
lend itself to the conclusion that estate recovery can be had against
property in which the decedent had no interest at the moment prior to
death.
The Idaho Supreme Court’s second important bit of statutory
construction involved the definition of “assets” found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(h)(1). That definition includes income and resources of both
169
the community spouse as well as those of the institutional spouse.
The definition of “assets” found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) overrules
state marital property law in both common law and community property states, forcing spend down of the community spouse’s property
170
to pay for the nursing home costs of the institutional spouse.
The
Idaho Supreme Court argued that the broad definition of assets in 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) includes property of the community spouse, and
therefore supports estate recovery against that spouse’s estate even
when the institutional spouse has no claim to those assets under state
171
law. This bootstrap reasoning leads to the state having two bites out
of the same apple. That is, the state can force spend down of both
spouses’ assets during life and then lay claim to the remaining assets
172
of the community spouse upon his or her death.
167. “A cannon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase
follows a list of specifics , the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594
(9th ed. 2009). See also NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (7th ed. 2007).
168. In fairness we might say that the statute is not well drawn to achieve clarity. The last phrase might have been written to read “[retained] life estates, living
trusts and other [similar] arrangements.”(bracketed words added).
169. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 794 (Idaho
2012).
170. Recall that resources of both spouses are considered for the Medicaid’s
means testing, subject to the spousal income and resource allowance rules. See
supra part II.A.4.
171. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 792–93.
172. The Idaho rule does, however limit estate recovery against the community spouse’s estate to property that had some community property history. Id.
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Though we may question the reasoning employed in McCormick,
our main concern is to consider where this sort of court-made law is
taking Medicaid recipients and their spouses. It seems to argue for increased use of divorce as a Medicaid planning mechanism, at least in
173
cases with more typical facts than McCormick. That idea will be explored more fully after the paper addresses a few other aspects of the
mechanics of estate recovery.
D.

A Life Estate and Other Transitory Interests Owned by the Recipient

In some states, estate recovery can be had against the actuarial
value of a life estate owned by the recipient determined on the date of
174
death disregarding the fact of death. In other words, life estate in175
terests are valued as of the moment immediately prior to death.
From a common sense standpoint, this seems unfair since the deceased person’s estate has no ownership interest in the property.
However, there is a certain logic to this approach when the remainder
was transferred gratuitously by the Medicaid recipient outside of the
176
look-back period. In those cases, the transferor may be seen as having employed the transfer as a device to avoid the transfer penalty
while retaining the enjoyment of the asset during life. Inclusion of the
actuarial value of the retained life estate simply dampens the efficacy
of this planning strategy. The rule makes less sense in those cases
where the Medicaid recipient is the beneficiary of a life estate created
by a third party.

173. I am thinking here of the case where the home was always community
property and thus would likely be divided 50-50 in a divorce. Following divorce
in such a case, I doubt even the Idaho Supreme Court would argue that the entire
home was subject to estate recovery. In McCormick, recall that the home was originally the separate property of Martha, the Medicaid recipient spouse. Had
George sought a divorce, the divorce court might have awarded the entire home
to Martha thus leaving it subject to estate recovery.
174. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10 at § 9.04[B][4]. See, e.g., State v.
Willingham, 136 P.3d 66 (Ore. Ct. App. 2006).
175. Id.
176. Those persons familiar with the federal estate tax will recognize some
similarity to 26 U.S.C. § 2036 (2012). Indeed Section 2036 is even more draconian
since it draws the entire remainder interest back into the gross estate. Id.
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The Deferral Rule

Estate recovery will be deferred until the death of the community
177
spouse. Further, the state will release the lien described below if the
surviving spouse wishes to sell the property because the state cannot
178
recover anything prior to the death of the surviving spouse. In some
states, the right to recover does not apply to the property in the name
of the community spouse, or the portion of the property owned by the
179
community spouse if the property is jointly owned. In most states, if
the couple leaves any assets in the name of the institutional spouse,
including title to the home, there could be a Medicaid lien against the
180
institutional spouse’s share of the property.
F.

The Undue Hardship Rule

Medicaid recovery may be waived where it will cause an “undue
181
hardship.”
If a Medicaid recipient is survived by a registered domestic partner, some states will recognize an undue hardship and defer recovery as it would in the case where a spouse survived the Med182
icaid recipient.
G.

Estate Recovery Liens

Federal law allows the states to place liens on the property of
183
Medicaid recipients in various circumstances.
Usually, Medicaid’s
184
right to file a lien only arises at the death of the Medicaid recipient.
185
However, some states permit an earlier filing.
If the property is
sold, Medicaid will be entitled to a share of the proceeds, even if the
186
Medicaid recipient is still living. In some states, the state can cause a
notice of encumbrance to be recorded in the chain of title of any real
177. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 9.03; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (2012).
Further deferral can occur if the couple who died was survived by a minor or disabled child. Id.
178. Id.
179. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.04[B][1], 9.04[B][2], 9.08[B].
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
181. U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(3). See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 9.05[A];
DAYTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 29:118.
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(b)(3)(A), 1396p(c)(2)(D), 1396p(d)(5).
183. Id. at § 1396p(a)(1). See DAYTON ET AL., supra note 10, at § 29:113.
184. Bleck et al., supra note 9.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 30.
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property interest held by a Medicaid recipient. The transition from a
188
Medicaid claim to a Medicaid lien depends on state law.

IV. Planning Techniques to Avoid Spend Down and
Estate Recovery
Based on the foregoing background and discussion we can now
set out various planning options to avoid or minimize estate recovery.
A.

An Overview of Medicaid Planning Techniques and Their
Relation to Estate Recovery

In our earlier work on this topic, my co-authors and I described
189
many Medicaid planning strategies. These include gifts beyond the
five-year look-back period, disinheritance of the institutionalized person; the use of special needs trusts for the institutional spouse; annuitization of retirement accounts and savings (often for the benefit of
the community spouse); spend down on the home or other exempt assets (called asset repositioning); caregiver agreements with family
members; certain transfers of the home to a spouse, child or sibling;
use of exempt assets (i.e., the home) to pay for the nursing home during a penalty period arising from gratuitous transfers; and, finally, di190
vorce or marriage avoidance.
Some of these are only designed to obtain Medicaid eligibility
while preserving wealth during the recipient’s lifetime. Others, most
prominently gifts and annuities, are designed to avoid estate recovery
as well. The liberal income rules and the restrictive resource rules
make the purchase of an annuity for the community spouse with excess resources an important planning tool for middle class couples.
Indeed, the annuity purchase option is the chief planning alternative
191
to divorce in many cases. But, annuitization has its limitations as a
planning tool. First, it does not work to protect the home since, nor192
mally, the community spouse will want to continue to live there.
187. DAYTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 29:113.
188. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 9.10[A].
189. Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 188–96.
190. Id.
191. See generally id. (discussing the benefits of annuitization and divorce to
avoid transfer penalties).
192. Indeed, both spouses may continue to reside there in states that support
Home and Community Based Services (HCBS) through Medicaid.
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Additionally, there are at least two other problems that can make annuitization less appealing. One problem is, it may force the sale of
appreciated assets and the sale of assets that are preferred to be kept
193
in the family. Another is that, it creates risk of loss due to premature
194
death. As discussed earlier, the single asset most at risk of estate re195
covery is the home.
But, recall that in some states estate recovery
196
can also be had against other property as well. In the next section, I
focus on whether, and to what extent, planning can avoid estate recovery with respect to homes, life estates of the institutional spouse,
the institutional spouse’s elective share of the community spouse’s estate, and property in which the institutional spouse once held a community property interest. What we see is that for married couples, divorce cuts most cleanly through all of the bureaucratic Gordian knots.
B.

Estate Recovery Planning with Respect to the Home

As I noted at the outset, the Medicaid recipient’s home is the
most common asset subject to estate recovery. There are, however, a
number of lawful methods for avoiding estate recovery with respect
to part or all of the value represented by the home.
1.

TRANSFER THE HOME AND PAY THE PENALTY

For a single person with a home of substantial value, it may be
advantageous to gift a partial interest in the person’s home after qualifying for Medicaid. For this approach to work, it is necessary to maintain enough funds to fully cover long-term care during any penalty
period arising from the transfer.
EXAMPLE: Effective Gifting of a Partial Interest in the Home
Mary, a single person already receiving Medicaid LTC services
owns an exempt house worth $400,000. Mary then gifts a 50% interest in the house and reports the gift to the state Medicaid agen193. See Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 174–75 (discussing how annuities can be
consider “gifts” and how the state will attempt to recover the value of gifts if a
person is unable to pay for nursing home care).
194. See id. at 174 ("The purchase of an annuity will be treated as a gift unless it
is irrevocable, non-assignable, pays out in equal periodic payments, and it is equal
to or less than the life-expectancy of the annuitant.”).
195. See id. at 162-63 (discussing the limits of exempt home equity).
196. See, e.g., Estate Recovery, INDIANA FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN.,
http://www.in.gov/fssa/OMPP/4874.htm.
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cy. Medicaid coverage would be terminated for X months beginning with the month after the month of the gift. The house is then
sold, and 50% of the sales proceeds to which Mary is entitled is
used to pay for care during the X month period of ineligibility.
2.

TRANSFER THE HOME TO CERTAIN CHILDREN OR SIBLINGS

It is always important to determine whether a penalty-free transfer of the home may be made. Such transfers are transfers to a child
who has lived in the home and cared for the applicant for the twoyear period immediately prior to institutionalization, or transfers to a
sibling who has lived in the home for one year and has an equity in197
terest in the home, or transfers to a disabled child.
3.

ESTABLISH TRUSTS FOR DISABLED PERSONS LESS THAN SIXTYFIVE OR FOR A DISABLED CHILD OF ANY AGE

As discussed above, there is no penalty for transfers to trusts for
the sole benefit of disabled children of the Medicaid applicant or for
198
the sole benefit of any disabled person under sixty-five. Thus, transfer of exempt property, such as the home, in those circumstances will
avoid estate recovery.
4.

TRANSFERS OF REMAINDER INTERESTS IN THE HOME OUTSIDE
OF LOOK-BACK

A planning technique for avoiding estate recovery is to transfer a
remainder interest in the home to a loved one outside of the look-back
199
period. The retained interest can be a life estate or a term of years,
but a life estate may not completely avoid estate recovery because of
the peculiar rules concerning life estates that some states have adopt200
ed.
A typical Qualified Personal Residence Trust (“QPRT”) might
201
well do the job. In many states, married couples may not need this
technique since transfers from one spouse to another are exempt from
202
the transfer penalty rules. Instead, they will likely employ the techniques described below. However, the great limitation of the remain197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(a)(2), 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iv) (2014). See supra Part IV.D. See
also Gilfix, supra note 58, at 31.
198. See supra Part IV.D.
199. See Gilfix, supra note 58, 31–32.
200. For an illustration of the problem, see State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs.
v. Willingham, 136 P.3d 66, 69–70 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
201. For a discussion of QPRTs, see Miller & Maine, supra note 161, at 945.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii) (2014).
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der transfer strategy is that it requires considerable advance planning
on the part of the homeowner since it must occur more than five years
203
before any Medicaid application is filed. Of course, it also involves
parting with property that might otherwise be kept for the community
spouse’s future benefit.
5.

TRANSFER OF THE HOME FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL SPOUSE TO
THE COMMUNITY SPOUSE

With respect to the community spouse, there is a one-time only
“snapshot” of community resources taken at the time of the institu204
tional spouse’s initial eligibility. Generally speaking, after the snapshot, increases or changes to the form of the community spouse’s
wealth, and uncompensated transfers made by the community
205
spouse, are disregarded.
For this reason, transferring title of the
home solely into the community spouse’s name may prevent the nursing home spouse from becoming ineligible in the event the home is
sold, as well as protect the home from Medicaid estate recovery in
206
some cases. This area of opportunity may be closing as states ramp
up their estate recovery efforts. There is no federal law barrier to the
states closing this opportunity.
6.

REVISE THE COMMUNITY SPOUSE’S ESTATE PLAN

The community spouse should consider revising his or her estate
plan to take into account the possibility that he or she may die before
the spouse on Medicaid. This is because an inheritance by the nursing
home spouse could cause ineligibility or subject the inherited re207
sources to estate recovery.
Through a new will, the community
spouse could leave the estate to a special needs trust for the institutional spouse or directly to children. In many states, the death of the
community spouse would not cause the disqualification of an institu-

203. FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 132–33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396rs(c)(1)(B).
204. FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 132–33.
205. Id. In this context, it is important to recall that the resource test for Medicaid eligibility combines the assets of both spouses without regard to title. Thus,
transfers between spouses are irrelevant in the initial determination of eligibility.
Id.
206. See Michael J. Millonig, Post-Eligibility Transfers, 3 NAELA J. 33 (2007).
Recall, however, the discussion of the McCormick decision in Part III.C.
207. Millonig, supra note 206, at 34.
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tional spouse and the assets would not be subject to Medicaid estate
208
recovery upon the death of the institutional spouse.
However, a
special needs trust created through a revocable living trust would be
subject to the look-back rules and, thus, would result in the disqualifi209
cation of the institutional spouse.
7.

DIVORCE, LEGAL SEPARATION, OR NON-BINDING UNIONS

Finally, we come to divorce as the emerging planning tool of
choice. When a married couple has at least moderate wealth, the asset
spend down requirements for Medicaid eligibility are painful to meet
and the prospect of estate recovery sweeping up what is left is a serious concern. In such circumstances, divorce can serve as a planning
option to protect the community spouse and to preserve resources to
meet the special needs of the institutional spouse. Divorce is also a
possible mechanism to preserve resources for loved ones. This is because, after a divorce, the assets allocated in the dissolution decree to
the non-applying ex-spouse are not countable resources for the Medi210
caid applicant and are not subject to estate recovery. An order allocating assets to a community spouse pursuant to a decree of legal separation appears to be as effective for this purpose as a divorce
211
decree. In many divorces, it will be necessary to appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent the nursing home spouse and it may not be possible to convince a court to allocate disproportionate resources to the
community spouse. Even an equal division may be beneficial to the
community spouse where there is a substantial amount of countable
assets. For example, if the couple has $500,000 in countable assets, an
208. See Moore & Landsman, supra note 10, at A-91. This may not be true in all
states. Id. See discussion in the preceding section of Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 791 (Idaho 2012). In that case, the institutional
spouse had converted her separate property (her home) into community property
a few years prior to entering a nursing home. Id. at 786. Later, the community
spouse exercised a durable power of attorney to quitclaim the institutional
spouse’s interest to himself. Id. The community spouse predeceased the institutional spouse and that led the state to seek recover Medicaid benefits paid to the
institutional spouse from the estate of the community spouse. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that federal law did not preempt Idaho state law permitting
such a recovery. Id. at 795.
209. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 135–37.
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2014); see generally 14.05 PLANNING
STRATEGIES FOR THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED, 2001 WL 1585266, 19.
211. Id.
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equal division would leave the community spouse with $250,000 rather than the maximum community spouse resource allowance of
$117,400. It is worth noting that divorce does not mean that the couple must live apart. Nor does it mean that the community spouse
cannot continue to provide care and certain types of support to the institutional spouse.
Many couples may find the idea of using divorce for Medicaid
planning too repugnant to consider. In some cases, other approaches
may be beneficial. For example, a married couple with substantial
countable assets might upgrade their home or purchase a new car as
212
discussed above and then later transfer any interest the institutional
spouse might have in the asset to the community spouse in order to
213
avoid estate recovery. But, this approach will not work in all states.
For moderately well-to-do couples that form late in life it might
be prudent to avoid marriage or to marry in a form that does not constitute a legally cognizable union. In this way, neither partner’s assets
become subject to spend down or the potential application of estate
recovery if the other partner should require protracted long-term care.
C.

Scenarios Where Divorce Is a Rational Strategy

There are many scenarios where divorce might make sense. In
general, we can say that the underlying circumstances for considering
divorce include:
1. The community spouse is reasonably healthy and/or the
motivation to provide an inheritance to someone other than
the institutional spouse is high;
2. There is a significant amount of wealth and income legally
allocable to the community spouse;
3. The life expectancy of the institutional spouse is sufficiently
great to create the likelihood of large uninsured long-term
care costs;

212. The essence of this technique, the reader should recall, is to turn a countable asset into an exempt asset.
213. 14.05 PLANNING STRATEGIES FOR THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED, 2001 WL
1585266, 19.
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4. And, there are insufficient countervailing circumstances
214
such as adverse pension or Social Security consequences.
As a caveat I might add that I assume here that the divorce and
attendant property division would be honored by the state Medicaid
authorities. I can, however, imagine such authorities attacking the divorce or the property division as sham transactions. It is not my purpose to advocate inappropriate divisions of property between the
spouses upon divorce. In my analysis, I assume a lawful divorce and
that state law generally will allocate the assets equally between the
spouses unless it is established that one spouse has a separate property interest such as in the case of inherited property that was never
commingled. I also assume that Medicaid planning is a rational response to a complex and expensive health care system. There are certainly moral concerns associated with this sort of planning, but I leave
215
those for others to debate and for clients to decide.
Set out below are some examples of when divorce might make
sense. The examples focus on moderately well-to-do middle class
couples. They are relevant to persons of greater or lesser means as
well.
Scenario 1: The Better off Community Spouse in a Second Marriage
The paradigm case for divorce is when the marriage is relatively
216
new, there is a prenuptial agreement and the community spouse is
well off in her own right.
Example: Alonzo, age seventy-five and Barbara, age seventy, a
married couple, have no children in common. Barbara has three children from a prior marriage. They married five years ago and live in
Barbara’s condominium in a retirement community. They have a
standard premarital agreement providing that each has no claim on
the property or income of the other. Barbara brought $600,000 in net
assets to the marriage in addition to the condominium. She has pen214. Id. at 15.
215. In an earlier article I considered this dimension of Medicaid planning. See
Miller, supra note 1, at 98–101.
216. It is useful to recall that Medicaid accords no consequences to the existence of a prenuptial agreement for purposes of the resource test. Thus, aside from
the Community Spouse Resource Allowance, the community spouse’s assets remain subject to spend down. See infra Part II.A.4(b).
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sion income and Social Security amounting to $4,000 a month. Alonzo
brought $100,000 of net assets to the marriage and has Social Security
and pension income of $2,000 per month. Alonzo has mid-stage Parkinson’s disease but is in otherwise good health and could live for
many years. As his Parkinson’s becomes more severe, the costs for his
long-term care will exceed $100,000 annually. By divorcing, Alonzo
and Barbara could save any part of her assets from Medicaid spend
down and save her home from any claim for Medicaid estate recovery. This preserves her quality of life and makes it probable that she
will die with sufficient assets to assure her children of an inheritance.
Barbara and Alonzo can continue to live together at least until he is
obliged to enter a care facility. Barbara can make certain gifts to
Alonzo and even establish a special needs trust (SNT) for his benefit
without adversely affecting his ability to qualify for Medicaid assistance. The remainder of the SNT can pass to her children without being subject to estate recovery.
Scenario 2: The Community Spouse in a First Marriage with Separate
Property
Even in a longstanding first marriage, it might be advantageous
to consider divorcing if the community spouse has significant separate property.
Example: Callie, age seventy-eight and John, age seventy-nine, a
married couple, have two adult children in common and have always
lived in a community property state. They married fifty years ago.
Five years ago John inherited $600,000 from his aunt. They used
$200,000 of those assets along with the proceeds from the sale of their
former home to buy a much nicer home worth $500,000 titled as
community property in both their names. State law might treat the
home purchase as a gift of $100,000 by John to Callie. John has retained the remaining $400,000 of his inheritance as his separate property under their state’s laws. The combined net worth of their other
assets is $300,000. Callie has pension income and Social Security
amounting to $2,000 a month. John also has Social Security and pension income of $2,000 per month. Callie has been diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease but is in otherwise good health and could live for
many years. As her Alzheimer’s disease becomes more severe, the
costs for her long-term care will exceed $150,000 annually. By divorcing Callie, John could save $400,000 of his inheritance, save his half of
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their non-exempt community property from spend down, and save
his half of the home from any claim for estate recovery. This preserves his quality of life and makes it probable that he will die with
sufficient assets to assure their children of an inheritance. Callie and
John can continue to live together at least until she is obliged to enter
a memory care facility. In some states, the home would need to be
sold in order to fully insulate John’s half of the equity from estate recovery. After the divorce, John can make certain gifts to Callie and
even establish a special needs trust for her benefit without adversely
affecting her ability to qualify for Medicaid assistance. The remainder
interest in the trust could pass to their children without being subject
to estate recovery.
Scenario 3: The Well-Housed Couple of Moderate Means
Even couples with modest amounts of income and exempt assets
in long-time marriages might find divorce a plausible strategy if the
couple has an expensive home in a state, such as Idaho or Colorado,
218
that aggressively pursues marital property through estate recovery.
Example: Greta, age seventy-five, and Hal, age seventy-seven,
are a married couple with three adult children in common and have
always lived in a community property state. They married fifty years
ago and live in a large home worth $700,000. The home is community
property under their state’s law. They have other marital assets worth
$300,000. Greta has pension income and Social Security amounting to
$2,000 a month. Hal also has Social Security and pension income of
$2,000 per month. Greta has been diagnosed with vascular dementia,
but, is in otherwise good health and could live for many years. As her
dementia becomes more severe, the costs for her long-term care will
exceed $150,000 annually. By divorcing with an equal property division, Hal could save $150,000 of their net assets from spend down,
and save his half of the home from any claim for estate recovery. This
preserves his quality of life and makes it probable that he will die with
sufficient assets to assure their children of an inheritance. Greta and
Hal can continue to live together at least until she is obliged to enter a
memory care facility. In some states, the home would need to be sold
217. Id. Of course, he could keep about $119,000 of their net assets anyway as
his Community Spouse Resource Allowance. Id.
218. See infra Part III. C. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.04[B] &
9.08.
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in order to fully insulate Hal’s half of the equity from estate recovery.
In many states, however, the couple might retain the home until they
are both deceased and estate recovery would only apply to Greta’s
half. After the divorce, Hal can make certain gifts to Greta and even
establish a special needs trust for her benefit without adversely affecting her ability to qualify for Medicaid assistance. The remainder interest in the trust could pass to their children without being subject to
estate recovery.
It is worth noting that there are other options that have significant appeal. They could gift a remainder interest in the home to their
children and hope to outlast the look-back period before applying for
Medicaid. Or they could sell the home and move to less valuable
housing and use the excess funds to purchase an annuity for Hal’s
benefit.
Scenario 4: The Well-Off Couple in a Longtime Marriage with Children
Divorce is at least a plausible strategy if a long-time married
couple is well off enough to have much to protect, but not so rich that
long-term care costs can be shrugged off.
Example: Dharma, age sixty-eight and Edward, age seventy-one,
are a married couple with two adult children in common and have
always lived in a common law state. They married fifty years ago and
live in a large home worth $1,000,000. They have other marital assets
worth $1,000,000. Dharma has pension income and Social Security
amounting to $4,000 a month. Edward also has Social Security and
pension income of $4,000 per month. Dharma has been diagnosed
with Alzheimer’s disease but is in otherwise good health and could
live for many years. As her Alzheimer’s disease becomes more severe, the costs for her long-term care will exceed $150,000 annually.
By divorcing with an equal property division, Edward could save
$500,000 of their net assets from spend down, and save his half of the
home from any claim for estate recovery. This preserves his quality of
life and makes it probable that he will die with sufficient assets to assure their children of an inheritance. Dharma and Edward can continue to live together at least until she is obliged to enter a memory
care facility. In some states, the home would need to be sold in order
219
to fully insulate Edward’s half of the equity from estate recovery. In
219. See infra Part III.C (discussion of McCormick). This is because in those
states a home with any history as joint tenancy or community property might be
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many states, however, the couple might retain the home until they are
220
both deceased. After the divorce, Edward can make certain gifts to
Dharma and even establish a special needs trust for her benefit without adversely affecting her ability to qualify for Medicaid assistance.
The remainder interest in the trust could pass to their children without being subject to estate recovery.
It is worth noting that there are at least two other options that
have significant appeal. The first is to annuitize some of their nonexempt assets for Edward’s benefit. The second is to make gifts to
their children right away while retaining enough assets to get past the
five year look-back period. The children, in turn, might choose to use
the assets to fund a special needs trust for the parents while keeping
221
the remainder interest for themselves.

the subject of an estate recovery action even though it is not marital property at
the time of the former community spouse’s death. This relates especially to the
court’s analysis in Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785
(Idaho 2012). See the discussion supra in Part III.C. Of course, McCormick did not
involve divorced spouses and so it is not directly on point. But the essence of the
court’s holding in McCormick was to permit estate recovery against property that
was solely owned by the community spouse because the property had once been
community property. It is possible that a court could extend this reasoning to
former marital property now owned by a former spouse of a Medicaid recipient. This extreme form of tracing is not presently the norm. See BEGLEY &
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.04[B], 9.08.
220. The home would presumably be retained as tenants in common with neither former spouse having any choice or right with respect to the other’s half.
This is because there should normally be no estate recovery against a former
community spouse’s interest in the home. Indeed, some states do not pursue estate recovery against the home even if the spouses remain married until death if
the home has been transferred entirely into the name of the community
spouse. See, e.g., 2 California Elder Law Resources, Benefits, and Planning §§ 11.71
& 83; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.04[B], 9.08.
221. It is doubtful the gift to the children could be conditioned on their establishing a SNT for the parents without triggering a challenge from the Medicaid
authorities.
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Countervailing Financial Factors Concerning Divorce

There are various financial benefits associated with marriage that
run counter to seeking divorce even though Medicaid spend down is
in the offing. First, if the community spouse has little income, he or
she may be entitled to a monthly needs allowance taken from the in222
come of the institutional spouse. Obviously, that right to such an
income allocation evaporates upon divorce unless it is awarded in the
decree.
Second, if the community spouse outlives the institutional
spouse, he or she may be entitled to an increased Social Security bene223
fit by stepping into the deceased spouse’s shoes. Generally speaking, the surviving spouse is entitled to succeed to the deceased
spouse’s monthly benefit if it is greater than her or his own monthly
benefit. However, this principle also applies to divorced spouses if
the marriage lasted more than ten years and the claimant did not re224
marry before age sixty.
Third, since transfers between spouses are ignored for transfer
penalty purposes, spending down by purchasing an annuity for the
225
benefit of the community spouse does not trigger the penalty. If the
spouses were to divorce followed by institutional spouse spend down
on an annuity for the ex-community spouse, the transfer penalty
226
would apply. Thus, when an annuity purchase will suffice, it renders divorce unnecessary and even counter-productive.
E.

The Problem of Incapacity

In some cases, where divorce might be a rational strategy, there
may be some question about the capacity of one spouse or the other to
engage in such planning. The question naturally arises whether a
guardian could bring a suit for divorce on the ward’s behalf. Authori-

222. See infra part IV.B.7.b.
223. See RALPH C. BRASHIER, MASTERING ELDER LAW, 222–23 (2010).
224. Id. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.336 (2015).
225. The annuity does have to be structured to satisfy certain requirements.
See Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 194–95.
226. See VALERIE J. BOGART, SELFHELP CMTY. SERVS., INC., FINANCIAL
ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICAID SPEND-DOWN PROGRAM IN NEW YORK 1,
16–22 (2010), available at http://www.wnylc.com/health/afile/46/70/.

MILLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

78

6/16/2015 2:51 PM

VOLUME 23

The Elder Law Journal
227

ties are divided on the issue. Even where it is permitted, whether
the guardian should do so is an open question. Typically we would
expect the community spouse to initiate the action, thus placing the
guardian in the role of opposing the divorce or not. The guardian is
also faced with the matter of taking a stand on the appropriate property division. In general, we would expect the guardian to assert the
ward’s right to at least an equal division of marital property. Of
course, in all cases, the spouses must have separate representation.
F.

The Problem of Overreaching Children

On occasion, I hear anecdotally of children or other family members seeking to protect their potential inheritances through aggressive
Medicaid planning for their parents. In some cases, they may be the
holders of durable powers of attorney granted by their parents or they
may even be the guardian of an incapacitated parent. Naturally, the
attorney must avoid acting in a manner contrary to the best interests
228
of the disabled person when the disabled person is the client. If the
client is the guardian, the lawyer must still allow for the guardian’s
229
obligations to the ward. A lawyer should withdraw from representing an agent or guardian who intends to act contrary to his or her du230
ties to the principal or ward.

V. Is Aggressive Estate Recovery Good Policy?
The primary policy justification for estate recovery is that it reduces the government’s costs of providing services to disabled sen231
iors. In 2005, for example, the states recovered over $400,000,000
232
from recipients’ estates. Estate recovery is consistent with the idea

227. See 32 A.L.R. 5th 673 (discussing the power an of incompetent spouse's
guardian or representative to sue for granting or vacation of divorce or annulment
of marriage, or to make compromise or settlement in such a suit).
228. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2014).
229. See id. at R 8.4 (2014).
230. Id.
231. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY
COLLECTIONS 3 (2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/
estreccol.pdf.
232. ERICA F. WOOD & ELLEN M. KLEIN, AARP, PROTECTIONS IN MEDICAID
ESTATE RECOVERY: FINDINGS, PROMISING PRACTICES AND MODEL NOTICES 37
(2007), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/2007_07_medicaid.pdf.
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233

that Medicaid should only be available to the poor. When exempt
assets are no longer needed by the Medicaid recipient or her spouse,
why should not the state have a claim for reimbursement? Moreover,
234
estate recovery discourages applying for Medicaid in the first place.
Instead, families may keep ailing seniors at home and care for them by
other means in order preserve their homes for inheritance. The
amount of foregone Medicaid claims due to the existence of estate recovery is unknown, but is thought to be substantial.
A counter argument to these points is that estate recovery unduly burdens the poor while failing to significantly reduce governmental
costs. Adherents of this view can point to the fact that estate recovery
brings back into the government coffers less than 1% of its total costs
235
of providing long-term care.
Additionally, the foregone claims induced by the probability of estate recovery may come at the high price
of leaving disabled seniors in precarious circumstances. It may also
place high care giving strains on already stressed families. The administrative burdens of the estate recovery system are also to be considered. Moreover, the unevenness of application of estate recovery
among the states may be seen as unfair. For example, spousal transfers of the home may avoid estate recovery in one state and not anoth236
er. The existence of a life estate in the recipient may trigger estate
237
recovery in one state and not in another.
These striking interstate
differences in a quasi-federal program are troubling.
An additional fairness concern is that estate recovery is more easily avoided or mitigated by the well-advised and the well-off. Should
a family’s ability to navigate the system be such an important determinant of who benefits from governmental largesse and who does
not?

233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at iv.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 38.
Protecting Your House After You Move Into a Nursing Home, ELDER LAW
NEWS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.elderlawanswers.com/protecting-your-houseafter-you-move-into-a-nursing-home-6897.
237. Keith Lyman, How Medicaid Recovers the Cost of Long-Term Care From Your
Estate After You Die, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/howmedicaid-recovers-the-cost-long-term-care-from-your-estate-after-you-die.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
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VI. Medicaid Policy for the Twenty-First Century
Should Embrace Disaggregation of Marital Property
Perhaps the most regrettable aspect of the increased estate recovery efforts of the states is the likelihood that divorce may become a
more prevalent Medicaid planning tool. Some practitioners tell me
the present generation of elderly have been reluctant to employ this
tool. Whether the boomers will evince this same reluctance remains to
be seen. I doubt it. As noted at the outset, marriage is becoming de238
institutionalized in America.
A governmental aid program that encourages divorce must be
regarded as questionable in a society that values marriage. Moreover,
the penalties that Medicaid imposes on the married are not in step
239
with the modern understanding and character of marriage.
Medicaid’s assumption that most of the assets of a married couple should
be available to pay for the nursing home bills of either spouse is predicated on the idea that a married couple is a single economic unit. This
idea in turn rests on the mid-twentieth century norm of a long-term
marriage in which the husband was the primary or sole bread-winner
and the wife was responsible for child-rearing. The present era of
marriage is characterized by dual-working couples, non-marriage for
many, and
delayed marriage, divorce, remarriage, and changing gender
roles . . . [T]he content of marriage has become heterogeneous and
contested. The institution of marriage no longer necessarily implies shared resources, shared expectations, shared children (or
any children at all), or defined roles in day-to-day life. Childless
couples, blended families, late-in-life marriages, and two-career
240
couples are no longer the exception: They are the new norm.

In this age of heterogeneity and individualism, the fairness of
imposing the financial burden of one spouse’s long-term disability on
the other spouse has become doubtful.
Though a complete disaggregation of marital property for Medicaid purposes might be difficult, that is the path we should be tak-

238.
239.
240.

Alstott, supra note 16, at 697.
See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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241

ing. In keeping with its general structure of cooperative federalism,
state property law should control. In my view Medicaid’s approach
toward the assets of married couples should mirror its approach to
their income. Recall there that Medicaid follows the name on the
check rule. Medicaid should accept that the assets of a married couple
should not be pooled to determine a spouse’s eligibility. Instead the
healthy spouse should be able to keep his or her full share of their aggregate assets. This should be true for estate recovery purposes as
well as for spend down. Under this approach, I do not suggest that
the community spouse resource allowance or the minimum monthly
needs allowance should disappear completely. Instead, they should
be kept in place to provide at least minimal assistance to low net
worth and low-income community spouses.

VII. Conclusion
On balance, the Medicaid system for assisting the married disabled elderly is seriously flawed. Various plans for reform have been
242
proposed and, thus far, rejected. This leaves us with Medicaid’s requirement that community spouses must spend down their life savings for the long-term care of an unhealthy partner before Medicaid
will help pay for that care. This approach is increasingly out of step
with the times. As a solution, this article proposes the disaggregation
of marital property for spend down and estate recovery purposes.
However, the present system seems to favor even greater efforts to restrict access to Medicaid. These efforts include more aggressive estate
recovery theories. In some states estate recovery now includes recovery against the estate of the community spouse. Thus, the pressure on
the institution of marriage is growing. Divorce may soon be the ultimate Medicaid planning tool. Many will consider this a lamentable
241. This approach would have something in common with those advocated
in the income tax and social security contexts that Professor Alstott addresses. See
id. at 697 (“My thesis is that the new individualism has rendered obsolete legal
doctrines and policy analyses that treat formal marriage as the proxy for family
life.”). There is a large body of literature on the question of disaggregating the
income tax. See, e.g., id.; Anthony C. Infanti, Inequitable Administration: Documenting Family for Tax Purposes, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 329 (2011); Lily Kahng, One
Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTING L.J.
651 (2010); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral
Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 985 (1993).
242. See Miller, supra note 1, at 101–06. See Wone, supra note 9, at 528.
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circumstance. I agree. In an era in which the institution of marriage is
already under siege, a statutory regime which encourages divorce is
unjustified. Nonetheless, if one thinks of marriage as primarily a con243
tractual arrangement for the mutual convenience of the parties,
Medicaid policy impacts the relative benefits and detriments of marriage in a substantial way. In some circumstances, Medicaid policy
makes divorce a rational, if unpalatable, response.

243. Of course there are other ways to look at marriage, and I do not mean to
disparage them. In our roles as lawyers, however, we are obliged to consider
marriage a form of legal partnership with utilitarian advantages and disadvantages.

